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    The present attempt is based on the idea that economics is-and remains, how-
ever mathematized it may be-one of the humanities. As such, the social phenomena 
it examines are the more explored in depth as they are systematically linked with 
other dimensions in which they are "embedded." While economists often want their 
prestige to be reckoned from results obtained only by using mathematical modeling 
techniques, concrete case studies show that, on the contrary, there may be more to 
understand than the mathematical models explain. Rostow's and Akamatsu's models 
provide precious-if also limited-hints for that purpose. I shall try here to suggest 
that "philosophy of economics" is instructive, providing grounds for recognizing the 
need for intercultural comparisons. 
    In the first part of this essay, I review some key features of Rostow's and Aka-
matsu's schemes, first in an overview, then in some detail. The second part will devel-
op how those schemes were applied to the study-cases of Russia and Japan, regarding 
their last hundred-and-fifty years. The last part will start from what those models have 
in common and what some of their limits are, so as to suggest that the phrase/concept 
of "classmates" may also be appropriate as to other instructive features, taken from 
continental social thought.
1. A Few Reminders on Rostow's Scheme in The Stages ofEconomic Growth and 
Akamatsuls "Flying Geese Model" 
1. Overview 
    "It is possible to identify all societies
, in their economic dimensions, as lying 
within one of five categories: the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, 
the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass-consumption" (Rostow 
1960/1995, p. 4). 
    The first stage of development is "primitive." Rostow calls it "traditional." If 
at all a stage of "development," it is the initial state-of-the-world for any given hu-
man community. Then come four developmental stages, such as degrees on a scale 
combining progress of time and technical mastery of men's material environment. 
Modem nation-building accompanies each new stage, with incremental power for a 
people (and, actually, its ruling classes). In that view, the fight to become the ruling 
elite is fiercer as stakes grow higher. In the case of Japan, it is easy to understand 
why the emperor struck back against the bakufu when, in the 1860s, the process of 
industrialization was on the verge of "take-off." Rostow's scheme explains at least 
partly the Japanese reaction to the Western powers' threat. For Russia, the avant-
garde political party advocated by Lenin fits both the Marxian scheme and Rostow's 
Non-communist Manifesto (as he subtitled his 1960 Stages of Economic Growth). 
Elites pull the whole nation up as they also get most benefit from its development. 
One already notices thus clearly that Rostow's views are more widely valid for a 
general approach not limited to mere economics. Also let us note, from the start, how 
closely economic and political notions are intertwined in this synoptic world-view of
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human civilization and transition towards modem capitalism.' 
    Of course, Rostow started with Great Britain as the first nation to leave the 
"traditional" state-of-the-world. His assessed chronology and typology go along, illu-
minating enough to accommodate most countries. Numerous specific situations could 
also be accommodated in his framework (which saved him from many criticisms),' as 
illustrated by his well-known chronological schema, adapted here (Fig. 1) from the 
Japanese edition of The Stages ofEconomic Growth.
Fig. 1. Chronology of developmental stages from take-off to the mass consumption era stage for 
some of the most important countries in the world. Symbols represent stages of growth: the arrow 
is the take-off (ririku) stage; the circle is the maturity stage (se~uku); and the plain gray is the mass 
consumption (k5do taishfi sh5hi) stage. Source: Rostow 1961, p. 15.
    One may see that Russia and Japan entered modernity through economic take-
off later than the Western powers, still soon enough to be themselves world-powers 
and colonies to none. The issue must be raised, because any modernizing country has 
had to face the reality that Western countries took off earlier on and would impact 
on newcomers. Nobody put it more clearly than another economist who had offered
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(even earlier, although in a somewhat different way, and with other purposes)' his 
own theory of development, Akamatsu Kaname, who wrote: "It is impossible to study 
the economic growth of the developing countries in modem times without consider-
ing the mutual interactions between these economies and those of the advanced coun-
tries. When Western European capitalism began to expand its production and trade 
on a world-wide scale, it awakened the less-developed areas of the world to modem 
economic development" (Akamatsu 1962, p. 3). 
    The take-off itself and the period of drive-to-maturity (Rostow), both in terms 
of economic and political power, was illustrated by both Japan's and Russia's empire-
building endeavors: a continental empire towards the East for Russia in the nineteenth 
century (some may add: an Eastern European march after World War 11), and for Ja-
pan, a maritime "Co-prosperity sphere" including Korea, then Taiwan, and larger and 
larger parts of China, until the war with the U.S.A. became unavoidable-and wished 
by the Japanese military in power in the 1930s.1 
    If one does not confine to quantifiable aspects of development, then the ideo-
logical stance that accompanied the drive to maturity is understandably central for 
both countries. For a more operative comprehension, some interpretation ("herme-
neutics" in philosophical jargon) may be in order in asking: what is the rationale 
behind their evolution? One needs an analysis of the stages of development that in-
cludes both historical data and the "productive reception" of Western influence in 
both countries (absorption of knowledge as such: the science of economics and its 
philosophical grounds). It may eventually lead us to contemporary facets of eco-
nomic life in both countries.'
2. Afew more technicalpoints 
    While Rostow favored an approach in successive waves that each country in-
dividually "surfed" through its own course, it clearly emerges from Akamatsu's work 
that a nolens volens cooperation necessarily happens. Rostow obviously acknowl-
edged what each country gained (and/or lost) from its predecessors at each stage of 
economic growth, but the notion of the hegemonic country is Akamatsu's (rehashed 
by others, famously Kojima, 2000, for instance, and Ozawa 2007). Akamatsu used 
the powerful symbolism of a very ancient image in Eastern thought, that of geese 
flying in unison (gank,5 keitai), to coin the phrase "flying geese pattern of develop-
ment" (gank5 gata keizai hatten). It is not our purpose here to detail the ancient Con-
fucianism-inspired image that applied within a nation. Akamatsu's innovative idea 
was to extend its latent explanatory power to relationships between different nations 
in modemity.7 
    As the FGM intends to explain the catch-up process of industrialization of 
late comer economies, it has since been used now and again for different countries 
"taking off '-and secondary literature is huge, from theoretical works (Ozawa 2003, 
for example) to more ready-to-use international conference papers (see, for instance, 
Okita 1985, on relationships in the Pacific). For Russia and Japan, development took
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place in "Class 111" of late nineteenth century "take-off 'designed by Rostow and they 
were labeled "classmates" by Ozawa (Ozawa 2007, p. 25). In order to appreciate the 
impact of the phrase/concept, let us remind a few more traits of the pattern inspired 
by the beautiful flight of wild geese. 
    Rather than a lengthy exposition (that the reader will find in numerous com-
mentators whom we shall not quote here), let us refer to Fig. 2, borrowed from Oza-
wa, where most ingredients for a comprehensive understanding and use of the FGM 
are combined. A structural comparison of various countries' developments, in rela-
tion with theories of international trade and "comparative advantages" is then pos-
sible: from the so-called "Heckscher-Ohlin" pattern of labor-intensive industries, to 
the so-called "McLuhan" latest high technology information and telecommunication 
(IT) industries shift.'
Fig. 2. Structural upgrading under Pax Britannica-led and Pax Americana-led growth-clustering. 
From Ozawa 2007, p. 15, used by permission.
     Now, Ozawa's interpretation extrapolates from Akamatsu's original ideas, and 
although it is undisputable that Great Britain was (in the nineteenth century) and the 
U.S.A. is (in the twentieth century) hegemonic and that they initiated the stages to-
wards new capitalistic ways, the patterns that they opened, based on renewed innova-
tive comparative advantages, are not all that there is to development. Such a view of 
the last two hundred years of history (at least, since the British Industrial Revolution 
started even earlier) is at the same time accepted by all, but when one looks back, it 
was more contested at various periods. In turn, France, Germany, Japan, and Soviet 
Russia not only opposed the hegemon, but seemed to be able to be the hegemon.
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Since the collapse of socialist central planning, the "Asian miracle" (to use a clich~ 
much in use today) also bears a challenge to the U.S. That series of competition issues 
is actually built-in in the FGM, so the best thing to do (as we obviously cannot discuss 
it all) is, not assuming any country's leadership, to briefly give some more technical 
information on the pattern involved, before moving towards the study-cases of Japan 





an intra-industry aspect: product development within a particular developing 
country with a single industry growing over three time-series curves, for instance 
import (M), production (P) and export (E). The hypothesis of a single production 
comes in handy when discussing such issues because of the difficulties in the no-
tion of the capital of a nation, which I will discuss later. 
an inter-industry aspect: sequential appearance and development of industries 
in a particular developing country, with industries diversified and upgraded from 
consumer goods to capital ones and/or from simple to more sophisticated prod-
ucts. 
an international aspect: subsequent relocation process of industries from ad-
vanced to developing countries during the latter catching-up process-that is 
implicitly believed by the analyst (the economist) as the natural and normal out-
come oftheir development. The old image of flying geese applied within a nation 
gets a new use and a vivid life in combination with "comparative advantage" 
trade theories.
Lately,
ment of Japan and the Pacific Region.' 
each stage of economic development, ar 
scheme and Akamatsu's model. We sha 
from take-off to maturity and its specifi 
ferently organized.
those three levels have been much discussed regarding the develop-
                  They naturally apply as well historically to 
                  d offer the chance to combine both Rostow's 
                  11 bear them in mind, although our approach
                 c capitalism in Japan and Russia shall be dif-
11. Combining Rostow and Akamatsu on Japan and Russia as "Classmates" in 
the "Competitive March towards Modernization" 
    In his preface to the third edition (dated 199011) of his Stages, Rostow's retro-
spective look upon the fate of his book as the U.S.S.R. is on the brink of collapse is 
rather moving: although he does not always seem to measure completely the upcom-
ing upheaval due to the event that he had contributed to forestall, one may see how 
relevant his interpretation remained, even outside the original context of Cold War 
fight on communism. Actually, the same could be said of FGM, regarding the con-
text of the 1930s and 1940s Japanese military, discarded after the 1945 defeat, while 
Akamatsu's ideas would enjoy a revival years later, not outdated in the least. In both 
cases, ideas were (it is a fact) by-products of specific times (military Japan and the 
Cold War) and thus came later to lack their original framework (Japan falling under 
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the U.S. spell, and communism, at least in its Soviet form, disappearing), but their 
scope was beyond their context and still operative to explain other developmental 
issues. 
     Apart from context, and about Japan and Russia being categorized by Ozawa 
as "classmates" in Rostow's third "graduating class of industrial development" (Oza-
wa 2007, p. 25 ff.), the question is how to combine both models. For Russia may be 
seen as being "hegemon" of socialist centrally-planned economies for almost half a 
century, between 1945 and 1990. The whole world is not under American spell then, 
and the pace of U.S. consumerist drive is not enough to explain "development" ev-
erywhere. To think of it all, a trustworthy chronological framework is needed first , 
and some reminders of earlier theories and ways of seeing things (Weltanschauun-
gen) now sometimes (wrongly?) forgotten. The political scene plays a significant role 
in that respect in shaping national economies at any given stage-from take-off to 
the opposition between consumerism and communism (well illustrated by Japan and 
Russia). I I 
1. The chronological developmentalframework and the political scene 
     Economic "take-off' takes place, according to Rostow, with the achievement 
of some regular rate of growth (as opposed to non-economic change in the traditional 
society or sudden accumulations of wealth produced by exogenous shocks such as 
wars), a sufficient rate of investment (through the supply of loanable funds) , and 
transition in primary key-sector agriculture and extractive industries (especially coal-
mining). The "spirit of entrepreneurship," otherwise famously related by Max Weber 
to Protestant ethics, but also called upon Confucianism to explain Eastern cases, is 
also needed. From the 1870s to the 1900s (in the Meiji era, that is) , that was the case 
regarding Japan and, perhaps a bit later, around the 1880s, for czarist Russia. 
     Alongside Rostow's guidelines, the "drive to maturity" came later, along the 
tracks of railways fueled by coal energy, and then, most importantly, through the 
diffusion of electric power. Especially in Russia, the change of political regime ac-
companied that moment: the U.S.S.R. was defined by Lenin as the "Soviets plus 
electric power." When that was achieved only, could the Revolution claim its start-
ing objective reached. Electrification through major dam projects supported heavy 
industrialization and planning under Stalin's iron fi St, 12 and it came at a high human 
price, reaching full achievement only after World War 11. That success stopped the 
initial impulse at its peak, so that maturity could only be achieved afterwards . What is 
often forgotten today is that, at that time precisely, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. truly 
competed in some industrial sectors (although not all of them; consumers' goods , as 
is well known, were a failure of the Soviets) as much as in their ideological stands. 
    In Japan, from the Meiji modernization on, the same stages are basically iden-
tifiable until the economy re-started after military defeat in World War 11. At the po-
litical level, the evolution was obviously different from the U .S.S.R., though it had 
in common that modernization took place under dirigiste governments. One may
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argue that military influence was almost always on the brink, from Meiji's seizure of 
power to coups against Taish6 era attempts at democracy, until that openly aggres-
sive strategy that ended in confrontation of the U.S.A. Even though a civilian way 
to domination was also followed by the Japanese elites, commercial methods were 
fit to hold dominion over Eastern Asia. The parallel between Russia and Japan is 
convincingly drawn by Rostow using technical notions of economic growth theory 
(Rostow, 1960/1995, p. 63-67) as well as by Ozawa (extrapolating from Akamatsu
Fig. 3. Sequential pattern of catch-up growth of Japan and Russia. From Ozawa 1996, used by 
permission.
and Kojima), as Figure 3 shows. 
    To make deductions from parallel economic development and political his-
tory is then, in a sense, nothing new: authoritarian and centralized power enhanced 
modernization in both countries. They already had in nineteenth century Prussia, as 
a preliminary basis to national German unity. Scope and impact, in a country with 
immense spaces and another overpopulated, were the same with a difference in scale, 
and the fact that being late-comers spared them obsolete techniques-as both FGM 
and other theories of return on investment suggest correctly: the burden of obsoles-
cence had already been borne by the Western "hegemon." 
    In Japan, the role of newly built major world-companies from the beginning of 
the modernization was resumed, after World War I (from which Japanese industries 
largely benefited), by fully built zaibatsu such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi, and after
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World War 11, despite some dismantling, by keiretsu. At the political level, the same 
phenomenon of regeneration may arguably be said to line up the genr5 council to the 
emperor, the military and, after World War 11, the business elite renouncing political 
dominion abroad, but claiming it again economically. Japanese oligarchies were thus 
in a sense as much (if not more) efficient than official planning boards , in order to 
share research costs, for instance, dispatch production , organize real competition (for 
markets) and grab benefits of sensible government-business cooperative programs in 
research and development. Testimonies abound that economic and political powers 
were colluding all along in Japan. Basically, features of a war economy were built 
into the Japanese economy even before war broke out , as well as into the Russian. 
(In Russia, the aim was to build "socialism in one country" against Trotskyite "world 
revolution," but in effect-although he never said it-Stalin often acted along lines 
of Trotsky's idea of running the economy supposedly "to the benefit of all the people" 
in "war communism economics.") 
     Now, while Soviet Russia was under unique party-rule, in Japan one may also 
doubt the role of "puppet" parties before and after the aborted attempt at democratic 
rule during the Taisha period. Thus, although following a path totally opposite from 
communism, Japan's development may have been planned (by nationalistic elites , 
military or civilian) just as much, not from bureaucratic planning boards but from 
"cadet" academies and general staff headquarters, as well as from "clubs" of cor-
porate chainnen and think tanks financed by companies such as the Mitsui G6mei 
Kaisha. In the thirties-that is, during the Great Depression that brought the Western 
capitalist world to the brink of collapsing-guidance by authoritarian powers was 
particularly appealing and more efficient at building economic strength (despite what 
free-traders say, even now, revising history). Data available today allow this conclu-
sion that we cannot detail here, but that a few contemporary observers such as An-
toine Zischka saw quite clearly." 
2. From take-off to consumerism vs. communism, and beyond 
     From the "take-off' onwards, the Russian and Japanese development stories 
are certainly not unmitigated success stories, even if those nations positioned them-
selves among the top world powers (belonging, in the present, to the "G8 club") . 
Either economically or politically, a "stop-and-go" process seems rather to be their 
common feature (see figure 3 again). Those upheavals, linked to wartimes (be it "hot" 
or "cold," worldwide in size or local, social, civil or international warfare), at times 
hindered their economic development, but at times also enhanced them (as in the 
case of World War I for Japan). In any case, since early modernization, history was 
brisk and directorial governments overwhelming in both countries . Stability may 
have been sought, but certainly it was achieved at a high price , including the suspen-
sion of major personal liberties for most of the time: Russia's Communist Party was 
an openly assessed directorate, and freedom of speech may not belong to Japanese 
language and tradition (one may wonder its authenticity behind the official rhetoric , 
under, and even after, GHQ rule). 
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     Conversely, Japanese economic success was impressive already around 1900, 
as the result of forty years of genr5 directorship and take-off. Next to "made in Ger-
many" products, "made in Japan" products were a must already in the thirties in East 
Asia, well before they invaded the world in the 1970s, and Japanese goods are now 
leading "soft" industries of entertainment of all kinds Oust behind the U.S.A., at the 
global level, and far ahead of more traditional European cultural goods). 
    That accepted parallel view of development holds then not only from take-off 
to the stage of maturity, but also from then on. But some major divergence also hap-
pened as capitalist countries entered a high-mass consumption period, under U.S. 
hegemony. Rostow suggested that U.S.S.R. elites had the following choice to face: 
either define their own way towards a new stage of economic development, different 
from that of the U.S.-led world, keeping the promise of communism in mind: "to all 
according to their needs, from all according to their abilities," or abandon their basic 
creeds. The FGM may lead to the same assessment, as the U.S.S.R. was the "hege-
mon" for the communist world." Rostow concludes that it was the Soviet failure in 
choosing that implied the failure to enter the mass-production and mass-consump-
tion era. The explanation given is that Russian political elites wanted to keep their 
power. 
    Yet, when one thinks about it, was it not paradoxical that communism would 
not engage mass production and mass consumption for the people? Was not that the 
core that its ideology seemed to demand? Instead, mass production and mass con-
sumption in capitalist countries seemed to achieve purchase power for all. Ozawa 
may be right in concluding: "Why did the U.S. win the Cold War? In a nutshell, it 
was not so much the build-up of U.S. military power under Ronald Reagan as the af-
fluence of the masses made possible by consumerism-that is the power of the Pax 
Americana-led growth clustering, that proved decisive" (Ozawa 2007, p. 27). 
     But Oawa may also draw an excessively rosy picture of U.S. hegemony, as a 
"benevolent victor" after World War 11
, and leaving aside, somehow, that (1) mass 
production implied a very intensive use of all possible earth resources (as if they were 
infinite, a belief apparently still held by those who made the decision not to sign the 
Kyoto Protocol of 1997) and (2) consumption requires purchase power on the part 
of consumers, which is not always the case, even in so-called "rich" countries. The 
bias may come from the fact that Japanese industry, scheduled to be dismantled under 
early postwar GHQ planning, was not completely taken apart, but rather was helped 
to recover so that it could assist in fighting against China under Mao's brand of com-
munism (in Europe, the equivalent strategy was the Marshall Plan). U.S. benevolence 
was a direct consequence of the Cold War, where no choice was left to American 
political and economic elites, considering that the U.S.S.R. was a real threat at the 
time (which tends to be forgotten today). To recall that fact does not mean to under-
value what the U.S.A. did, with respect to the defeated countries Germany-at least 
its Western part-and Japan. It is simply reckoning that it acted wisely while clearly 
understanding its self-interest (what France was unable to do in 1919 at the Versailles
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peace conference, for instance). 
    The fact that people believe in idealistic good-will implies that the latter bears 
some efficiency, not that it is not rhetoric-because it is, as politics always is. Thus, 
while Japan benefited from U.S. orders-so much that it was sometimes derisively 
called the "fifty-first state"- Soviet Russia was of course shown no benevolence . 
Then first in line as the other super-power, Russia challenged U.S. hegemony (social 
order, economic positions, ideology), competed, and finally lost the war in 1990 (after 
various episodes in places such as Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, and Afghanistan). Let us 
remember, conversely, that Russia not only suffered, but also benefited from interna-
tional competition-that is, as long as its population was in the "mood" to fight for 
industrialization and endeavors in non-consumer goods hoping for a brighter future , 
which was, of course, never to come. This is where Rostow's scheme as well as FGM 
might lack the capacity to identify what needs to be known about the agents them-
selves in order to understand development stages: some kind of "self- conscience" or 
"mood
," on which we shall come back later. It is not enough to describe a mechanism 
if its acting parts are taken for granted. And, of course, while people are taught things, 
and given orders, if they are not kept to believe them sincerely, then "lip-service" will 
not do, even though it may seem so. Communist leaders learnt that, at last. 
     In other words: nobody ever wishes to renounce their own way, unless they feel 
more appeal elsewhere. That explains Ozawa's conclusion why the U.S.A. was the 
victorious "hegemon" although it was not the only one for a long period in the twen-
tieth century. What it seemed to offer shaped people's minds all over, even across the 
iron-curtain (or even more, paradoxically, because of it). More efficiently than any 
lesson, the development stage reached in the consumption era lured all, because it 
seemed a foreseeable goal. The "Japanese consumerist pact" between companies and 
employees famously worked on that promise: work hard and you will be able to afford 
some nice standard of life (including children's education). In Russia, on the contrary, 
the promise once made by communism to satisfy all according to their needs, asking 
them in return to contribute according to their abilities, was not fulfilled, and became 
the stuff of routine official speeches and a mere joke in the people's minds. So, it 
was, in a sense, not because of communism,, butfor a lack of it, a lack of what it was 
intended to give, that the economic system built in its name failed in the face of its 
loathed other: paradoxically, but quite simply, consumerism seemed naturally more 
and more adequate to satisfy needs. 
     The fight of consumerism vs. communism ended when facts proved that recov-
ery and rebuilding the nation after World War 11 had not led to expected outcomes , 
but clearly different outcomes in defeated Japan and in victorious, but "fatigued," 
U.S.S.R. True, the war had nowhere been so strenuous than in the U.S.S.R., but the 
collapse did not come then. It was much later, when hope had disappeared and what 
one may call "moral strength" had vanished. Already in the 1970s (earlier among in-
tellectuals), openly during the 1980s (that is forty years after the war), despite seem-
ingly growing influence of communism (through anti-colonial movements), the gap
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with the U.S.A. in economic consumption terms was so huge and directions taken, 
not only opposed between themselves, but also so antagonistic to their promises, that 
a political explanation of the then-impending collapse does not seem sufficient. One 
system provided (or seemed to provide) what the other had in some way promised. 
The end of the story (collapse of the U.S.S.R.) was already inscribed in that choice 
(Ozawa, 2005, p. 19, 184). 15 Now, Ozawa's political argument too may look sim-
plistic, both historically (what did China do? Why did not Russia do it?)" and theo-
retically, as it seems to have no grounds on which to base explanation of the agents' 
behavior. 
    Although Rostow argued, in that respect, that between Marx and himself the 
"first and most fundamental difference between the two analyses" was his own aware -
ness of the role of agent-based consciousness, the critical words are "consciousness" 
and "determines."" What is then needed is an explanation that cannot be taken for 
granted and merely borrowed from mainstream modeling. Because a link seems to be 
missing, both in Rostow's scheme and in the interpretations of FGM by followers of 
Akamatsu, some deeper explanations are in order. In the next section, while showing 
some built-in limitations of those schemes (neither displaying all of them, however, 
nor discussing the huge secondary literature), we will suggest a few hints taken from 
continental philosophy and/or social thought.
111. Scope and Limits of Rostow's Scheme and Akamatsu's Model as Made Evi-
dent from the Study Cases of Russia and Japan 
    It is not realistic here to try to propose general theoretical alternative views 
to such well-refined models as Rostow's and Akamatsu's. Still, some insight into 
other theories of the stages of development, including other operative notions are 
in order-and it is up to the reader to decide whether they enrich the basic schemes 
discussed heretofore. In this section, I will stress some indetermination and/or limi-
tations in Rostow's and Akamatsu's schemes, and then I will submit concepts that 
focus the analysis on agents themselves-in other words, I will try to give some flesh 
to the "economic agent" at the basis of the models, thus truly following what both 
economists suggested when they found themselves somewhat out of step with the 
superficial neoclassical mainstream. 
1. To be or not to be. . . "mainstream "? Limits affecting individual rationality in 
describing societies 
    Rationality of the economic agent is a topic for many debates, not to enter here. 
But the early reluctance shown by mainstream economists to acknowledge Rostow's 
growth theory is meaningful in itself. Rostow seemed to extend agent's instrumental 
rationality beyond the usual limits traditionally accepted (in the mainstream). Yet, 
he did ground his work on standard economics. How to explain, then, the somewhat 
reluctant reception that he got? Rostow had borrowed some generally accepted views 
of the individualistic economic agent, but he had also refused to limit himself to 
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usual econometric tools for implementing mere "instrumental rationality." Contrary 
to "pure" economic theorists of his times, he did not assume "one-hundred-per-cent 
rational" agents, but rather culturally "embedded" ones. The notion of such "embed-
dedness" has, since, been widely accepted and some have even tried to incorporate it 
into models. For that reason, Rostow is to applaud. 
    While Rostow did not endorse hypotheses such as absolute rational expecta-
tions, he acknowledged external factors (such as the political body, as amply shown 
above). By doing so, he was "deviating" from mainstream standards, and his theory 
could accommodate a wholly different "view on the world" than the bland vulgar-
ized "positivism" of econometrics (made famous by Milton Friedman in his 1953 
essay "The Methodology of Positive Economics"). Yet, Rostow's ground remained 
standard individual analysis, though with less constraints: that made him the target of 
mainstream advocates but also of their critics, "heterodox" economists, including the 
Marxists that he himself designated as his opponents (as will be discussed below). 
     In a case such as Japan, taking into account more aspects than is usually done 
in mainstream economics is not at all useless. Whether the Japanese population fit the 
image of economic agents as automata more than any other kind of agents may be a 
question devoid of meaning except for nihonjinron. But to know more about the cul-
tural background of modernization in the only country outside Europe that achieved 
modernization as an example of Rostow's "Class 111" would seem wise, to say the 
least. Here, Japanese studies are in order, even more than in any other case-although 
Russia was also European, it was not Western and could as well use some such back-
ground analysis. Definite descriptions of self-consciousness of the activities of agents 
in such countries are an appealing task to undertake (if not here). 
    Now, what can be said of Akamatsu's model? Its innovative facets reside in 
describing industrial cycles at various levels, as seen above. But his underlying as-
sumptions on the nature of the agent remain close to mainstream equilibrium theo-
ries. His ideas, as developed by disciples Kojima and, later, Ozawa, among others, 
indeed introduce some necessary dynamics into the neoclassical framework, but do 
not question fundamentals per se. Not intended to upset the main frame, they rather 
supplemented it in areas where needed, making it applicable to cases such as Japan 
and Russia. 
    Also true, both schemes display a sequence of stages claimed as valid for all 
nations, implying that the same terms would fit various realities. That is indeed the 
whole point of the theorists' endeavors. But one may want to ask what the word 
"traditional" means when alternately relating to early modem Britain
, modernizing 
Japan, or "traditional" Russia of the Mir peasantry-not to say anything about the 
Pacific islands regions or Africa? That scheme thus deals less with specific substan-
tial traits than with "laws" of change and patterns that may indeed be common." If 
terms such as "traditional stage" imply some implicit judgments, those are easily 
challenged by specialists of the many social sciences involved (anthropology, sociol-
ogy, etc.) Aware of such possible criticisms, Rostow answered, without infringing
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neo-classical basics that, roughly, it was not much of his business. At the same time, 
his innovative explanatory designs called attention to his own scheme." Akamatsu's 
followers did also roughly the same, developing their own brands of FGM; in their 
case, few complaints from outside their field were heard. 
     One point may still be noted, as a framework that is compatible with neoclas-
sical stands potentially generates another contradiction, in exactly the opposite direc-
tion: while accommodating other dimensions, were not such schemes trapped in a 
contradiction between pure individualism and society (macro-)level analysis? For 
instance, as alluded to above, troubles appear at the theoretical level with concepts 
such as the "stock of capital of a nation." Because each and every production unit 
can be priced (through monetary valuation), does it suffice to add those prices to 
get such an expected figure? It is truly advantageous, as it allows using production 
function curves which macro-economic neoclassical economists like to use-but is it 
consistently possible? Economists often act against their own methodological claims 
in such cases.10 Anyway, practically speaking, in order to compute an annual national 
rate of growth, for instance, they cannot avoid doing precisely what they may oth-
erwise condemn. From the standpoint of rigorous "methodological individualism," 
such notions and such practices do not make sense." From the macro-economic point 
of view, it is hard to relate all that to underlying individualism, but also to "institu-
tionalism." Better leave here a debate that belongs elsewhere, stressing that one might 
only gain a clear-headed perplexity." 
Z The various dimensions of anti-communism 
     Another dimension, and difficulty, in Rostow's analysis is his intention, made 
explicit in the subtitle of his work, to write A Non-communist Manifesto. Although 
not labeled an "anti -communist Manifesto," his book served as such for propagan-
dists whom Rostow never opposed. He himself stressed that his impulse towards 
growth models arose out of his dissatisfaction with Marx, particularly on two issues 
that engaged him scientifically (and professionally as an economist): "bringing mod-
em economic theory to bear on economic history" and "relating economic to social 
and political forces, in the workings of whole societies" (Rostow 1960, Preface) . 
When he was still young, he "specifically, found Marx's solution to the problem of 
linking economic to non-economic behavior. . . unsatisfactory, without then feeling 
prepared to offer an alternative." The Stages, that Rostow wrote much later, was to 
fulfill that original goal. In the case of Russia, Rostow's "non-communism" would 
also play a role as a form of condemnation of the Soviets, although the book was not 
meant as a pamphlet-it was all the more convincing and influential in countercheck-
ing communist views for that reason. 
    In the third edition of his book, for the sake of clarity, Rostow dedicated a 
whole chapter to what distinguished him from Marx. Let us stress two points: 
1) as already mentioned, most important to Rostow was "the first and most funda-
   mental difference between the two analyses [Marx's and his own] lies in the view 
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taken of human motivation" (Rostow, 1960/1995, p. 149). Significantly, the same 
criticism is now made by "heterodox" economists to mainstream ones, so that, 
given what we said on individualistic analysis, Rostow's views could suggest 
the same criticism. Something similar might be said of the second point, where 
maximization and Marxism become intertwined.
2) Rostow reproaches Marx for the rigidity of his development stages, thinking that 
   himself can elude the problem because "[his] notion of balance among altema-
   tives perceived to be open is, of course, more complex and difficult than a simple 
   maximization proposition; and it does not lead to a series of rigid, inevitable 
   stages of history" (ibid.). One notices that Rostow's view of Marx is a caricature, 
   making it too easy to discard his opponent. Even Lenin accommodated stages of 
   history! (when suggesting that Russia would have its revolution before Germany, 
   contrary to Marx's view of contradictions in industrial countries coming first). 
   Actually, contradictions appear at each and every stage. For Russia, they gener-
   ated modem productivity within "communism." Often, Rostow appears simply 
   at fault in assessing Marx because he used some rather vulgar (and inaccurate) 
   form of it, to refer rather to Soviet Russia (Stalinist) views .21 Rostow was aware 
   of such difficulties and quickly turned to his own demonstration, the polemical 
   and outdated nature of his work showing then. 
     But anti-communism is multi-faceted, and Rostow's pattern, favored by anti-
communist leagues worldwide, spread widely (with assistance from several gener-
ously funded private and public institutions). Here, leaving aside such political incen-
tives, we shall stress that success also came because Rostow offered a world-view 
                                                 21 that economics in the "free world" was lacking. Propaganda cannot hinder the fact 
that his theory in itself was truly appealing because it provided a view encompassing 
what econometric modeling and statistical data left out: some "meaningful" views of 
the world. 
    Still, another criticism can then be raised, for such a view is not falsifiable any 
longer: once upheld, such a "world-view" is almost always defensible against dispar-
aging criticisms, even based on data. Thus, it becomes a "doctrine" and un-scientific 
as such, along Popperian arguments. That makes Rostow's scheme vulnerable to the 
same reproaches Marxism faced. Not discussing here Rostow's answer, let us notice 
the parallel and the common-ground that is shared by any anti-positioning with what 
it opposes. 
    As regards FGM, one may think that it escaped the last counter-argument for-
mulated against Rostow, as it itself did not directly attack Marxism as such. And 
it shared some of the appeal for a "world-view," just as Rostow's scheme . Its de-
velopment patterns could then also be applied to the U.S.S.R. "hegemon" in cen-
trally-planned countries, while describing international economics and leaving aside 
the basics of communism. On the political scene, the cooperation of conservative 
postwar Japanese governments with Cold War U.S. strategic policy played a role in
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propagating the FGM, and so did U.S. interest in maintaining Japan as an East Asian 
base prepared for action against Red China or the Soviet Union. At the theoretical 
level, however, the FGM was not intended to serve the purpose of counter-propagan-
da. Yet the FGM does suggest that there are benefits, even for Third World countries, 
in U.S. domination-where the U.S. is the "leading goose." Thus, one may interpret 
domination as double-edged, as having a positive as well as a negative side, and not 
condemn it." 
    The revival enjoyed by FGM in the 1970s and 1980s came from the fact that 
Japan's economic miracle was imitated by South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore. Those countries seemed to display an alternative view to economic de-
velopment. Therefore, theories taught through anti-colonial socialist movements set 
back. Neither orthodox Marxists, nor leftist theoreticians such as Frantz Fanon or 
Samir Amin of the influential leftist French school of the 1960s and 1970s would 
have used the word benefits to describe anything arising out of colonial domination; 
they saw only the hindrances due to it.16 As a number of Asian economies rose mas-
sively (including lately, of course, China and India), renewed versions of Akamatsu's 
ideas remain attractive. As these ideas could also help to explain, at least partly, the 
Soviet collapse, they might be endowed with predictive power. But that mostly shows 
that theories of stages of development fare better when a multifarious approach is 
taken than when a monistic approach (such as "class-warfare" used by Marxists) is 
used. This observation brings us back to politics, beyond economic data. But politics 
is not sufficient in itself to provide the explanatory power we seek. That drives us to 
resort for help to other, somewhat earlier concepts regarding the transition to mo-
dernity such as those linking the nature of an economy and a people's mood and/or 
agents' "state of mind. 1117 This is what we shall examine last. 
3. More "cultural" and continental hints
     Let us resort here to some continental viewpoints and "older" concepts back 
to the era of Japanese and Russian "take-off." Besides authoritarian centralization, a 
common trait was that the planning of activities made sense with respect to earlier 
C*ese" in the transition towards modem capitalism: especially in Germany
, but also 
in France (remained "Colbertist" while becoming later an industrial power) and even 
in Britain, known as the earliest goose and the unabated advocate of "laissez-faire."" 
In Germany (maybe the most probing case), such spirit was called "soziales Keinig-
turn" (social monarchy). Along with the quest for political unity, nineteenth-century 
Germany sought economic development without the social evils blatant in Britain. 
Surely, even in modem industrial times, the influence of earlier fiscalism and cam-
eralism (brands of German Mercantilism mixed of early Treasury policy) was felt 
through the administration (Verwaltung), but such traditions were playing in Russia 
too (though the basis was more peasants than artisans) and in Japan, where the uni-
fication longed for in Germany had already been achieved and consolidated during 
more than two-and-a-half centuries of bakufu rule (thus bringing all the advantages
332
Japan and Russia as "Take-off 'Classmates?
that Bismarck sought through customs unions [Zollvereine]). 
     German academic creeds also found young Japanese scholars ready to fol-
low and the so-called shakai kanry5 of the imperial government helped hold Japa-
nese society together while enduring the shock of modernization." But individual 
responsibility for finding one's pittance, even in the deepest misery, did not lead to 
revolution in a country such as Japan, when it did in Russia. Why? Was misery less? 
Were councilors to the ruler wiser in Japan? Were social (and "socialist") thinkers in 
Russia participating more into revolutionary ideals? The building of national "Com-
monwealths" asks for more answers than models can offer. Those answers had been 
sought in France and Germany before, and social thinking raised from that concern 
(from Lorenz Stein to Max Weber in German-speaking countries, Auguste Comte 
and Emile Durkheim in France). Some of their lessons could do well, even today, for 
economists-not all of them, naturally: for instance, the concept of "anomy" mean-
ing a lack of social control (Durkheim) would certainly explain some features in 
France, but neither in Russia, nor in Japan. Conversely, excess of such social control 
brings about other social evils, either the reverse ones, or the very same ones due to 
some reverse excess in society." 
     In front of undisputed economic success for countries taking off later, a major 
difficulty for those newcomers was not to become overbearing and succumb to the 
temptation to become aggressive, although combined over-production and lack of 
resources (Japan) or ideological self-certainty (Soviet Russia) were strong incentives 
to do so. Failing to resist temptation, both countries were largely destroyed. They 
re-started after World War 11 but towards two different fates (as seen in the section 
above: communism vs. consumerism and final collapse vs. second world-economy 
ranking-but let us remind ourselves that Japan is only recovering from ten years 
of crisis after its "bubble," and Russia is now lavished with money from energy re-
sources, of which it has plenty). Thus, in fact, not only does history matter, but it can 
be made operative within models, as long as a dynamic standpoint is adopted, and the 
agents' own views are incorporated within analysis. 
    Here, the FGM's trait that latecomerscould willingly accept the idea that the 
hegernonic country could be beneficial to them, even though taking advantage of 
their resources at the same time because they were still lagging behind, that very trait 
deserved much attention in the cases of Japan and Russia because they alternately 
played both roles: the laggard and then the hegemon, for a part of the world at least. 
Also, if, at times, the latter role was militarily forced upon other countries, still, it 
was never as efficient as when those, consciously, used that relationships to their own 
profit, in order to "take-off' in turn. 
    Understanding such a move requires notions that would encompass at the same 
time the benefits from operative models and also show the missing links between 
the multifarious levels of analysis. In other words, to agree that some supplementary 
perspective of social and cultural thought is welcome, one does not have to assume 
Hegel's "objective spirit" to agree that the "mood," or the "state of mind," of the
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economic agents matters, within different cultural frameworks-whether conveyed 
through patriotism, religious beliefs, or something else. (Was not Marxism, and its 
earthly supposedly "Heaven to be" state, said to be some national cult in Russia, be-
fore being discarded?) Calling to the agents' own plans and expectations, which are 
not always rational, is also enlightening for works otherwise based upon untenable 
hypothesis-like full-grown rationality, precisely not designed for the sake of any 
specific reality. 
    Now, history deals with such specificities. From where did the crisis of histori-
cism in mainstream economics that has lasted for a century come, then? It was an-
chored in unilateralist views on on the part of both historical and analytical research-
ers. "Historical" economists lost all credibility in the face of positivist ideas although 
their approach was naturally suited to development matters, but because their defeat 
was justified (in view of Menger's ideas, for instance)." A lack of theory is a sin that 
cannot be compensated for-whereas limits due to modeling can be successfully en-
riched with adequate "cultural" concepts. By allowing for individualistic mainstream 
analysis to be supplemented by experimental cultural notions regarding Russia and 
Japan, Rostow and Akamatsu made valuable contributions indeed. 
    Another, and last, example: at the time when Japan and Russia "took off," 
France and Germany were fierce enemies. They more or less started the two world 
wars. Russia and Japan received both influences in that period-although not equal-
ly." In both countries, modem elements within government elites and the democrats/ 
revolutionaries were bent towards the West (in Japan some Meiji genr,5 on the one 
hand, and democratic spirit endorsed by Nakae Ch6min on the basis of Rousseau's 
ideas, on the other hand). Japan and Russia were changed, even politically, through 
that new "regimen" shaping modernization. Macro-economists exploring paths of de-
velopment and growth theory should bear that in mind. And they could even do more, 
for instance, by analyzing how such influential boards as Japan's Shakai Kanry6 Gak-
kai, modeled upon the German Verein far Sozialpolitik (Union for Social Politics), 
developed; this deserves study, not only for improving our understanding of the past, 
but also for today."
Concluding remarks: social thought and Japanese studies help 
    In the preceding pages, we reminded the reader of the models of development 
stages and growth theory by Rostow and Akamatsu (and some of the latter's follow-
ers, like Ozawa) in order to assess the comparison between Japan and Russia on their 
way towards modernization and industrialization. We ended up suggesting how a 
supplementary dimension would prove useful, that would be inspired by conceptual 
tools different from those of mainstream economics. The track followed in this in-
quiry was historical on purpose-putting to the fore economic and political concerns, 
but showing how some links could thus be missed. The hard facts of statistical data, 
for instance, must be wisely culturally adjusted, so as not to overshadow other major 
aspects in economic behavior, such as self-restraint in the course of economic action, 
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and the partly imaginary self-representations on the part of individual agents, the 
influence of their creeds and beliefs-and, namely, in the cases studied here, of such 
factors as ideology, a tendency to anomy or, on the contrary, excessive homogeneity. 
    Some concepts forged in countries such as France and Germany when they 
had modernized, in the second "graduating class" of the nineteenth century, can be 
used even today, under the assumption that they are recalled to attention, and not left 
into oblivion by modem economists. One dimension of the issue being the difficult 
relationship between methodological individualism and macro-economic analysis, 
economic behavior may be convincingly grasped through concepts such as the "state 
of mind" of the members of a people (in the German original, die Gesinnung eines 
Volkes does not always take into account the individuals as such, but it may do so). In 
any case, it could accomplish more than barren, even though accurate, econometric 
modeling. Especially in the case of transitional periods and development stages, in 
order to understand what truly happens, how could one remain blind to a dimension 
that rough figures leave aside-although the fact that such figures are available is 
welcome in itselP 
     The two "classmates" (as Ozawa named them), Japan and Russia, shared much 
ambivalence in the way they were treated within Rostow's and Akamatsu's schemes, 
those being partly grounded within the neoclassical framework and partly indepen-
dently in search of a new growth theory-Marx's own proposed framework was un-
satisfactory to the eyes of the modem economists, as Rostow explicity and provoca-
tively stated in 1960. Also, of course, one could not be totally satisfied with that other 
traditional "pushing vs. hindering" pair of concepts-where the role of the "pusher" 
or of the "troublemaker" was, in turn, played by the State, its political dirigisme in 
particular, private short-sighted interests, also, at times, and even more cultural inter-
players, like religious beliefs or traditions. 
    What the analyst desperately asks for, especially when confronted to such 
changes as the evolution of countries like Japan and Russia have displayed, is more 
"meaning" . Now that, since the USSR collapse, some brands of "sociological uni-
lateralism" (undermined by sympathetic positions adopted towards some political 
regimes) are gone, social thinkers have entered the age of their own totally "global-
ized" community, where they can freely be reminded of the origins of most of their 
concepts within continental philosophy; it is up to them to direct those towards new 
achievements in the economic globalized framework. 
    That is also why, in their own times, attempts by Rostow, Akamatsu and their 
likes, were so successful. They got attention because they enlarged the (too) often 
short-sighted views of econometrics and mainstream economics. True, their limits 
were somehow built-in due to the kind of science they clang to. Therefore, they also 
appeared, just at the same time, both incredibly illuminating (which warranted their 
success) and somewhat deceptive in the end. We have tried to show that, in order to 
make some of their underlying assumptions explicit, the cases of Japan and Russia, 
once displayed against their contextual background, are precisely some right exam-
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